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THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
DANIEL CORNELL COSBY, : Case No. 20100974-CA 
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Appeal from a judgment of conviction for two counts of Violation of a Protective Order, 
third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code section 76-5-108, one count of 
Tampering with a Witness, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code section 
76-8-508, and one count of Domestic Violence in the Presence of a Child, a Class B 
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District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable William W. Barrett, 
presiding. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
DANIEL CORNELL COSBY, : Case No. 20100974-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Cosby's Appellant's Brief argues that the district court abused its discretion 
when it sentenced Mr. Cosby to both jail time and thirty-six months of zero-tolerance 
probation. This Reply Brief does not repeat those arguments and instead (I) illustrates 
that Mr. Cosby's appeal is not moot because he requests judicial relief that would still 
affect his rights, and (II) clarifies that sentencing courts should consider relevant 
mitigating factors even in cases not involving a concurrent/consecutive sentencing 
decision and that Mr. Cosby's new fatherhood is one such mitigating factor. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MR. COSBY'S APPEAL IS NOT MOOT 
Because Mr. Cosby argues on appeal that it was an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion and excessive to sentence him to both jail and probation, his appeal is not moot 
despite the fact that he is now out of jail and serving probation. As the State notes, "[a] 
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case is deemed moot when the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the 
litigants." Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989); Appellee's Br. 9. Mr. 
Cosby's Appellant's Brief asks this Court to reverse and remand for resentencing because 
the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to both thirty-six months of 
zero-tolerance probation and jail. Appellant's Br. 1-2, 9. While it is true that when Mr. 
Cosby filed his Appellant's Brief on March 2, 2011, he was still serving his jail sentence, 
and that when the State filed its Appellee's Brief on June 27, 2011, he had been released, 
Mr. Cosby is still serving the second part of his sentence-—thirty-six months of zero-
tolerance probation. If this Court granted Mr. Cosby's "requested judicial relief— 
reversal of his sentence and remanding for resentencing—the trial court could resentence 
him to jail, give him credit for time served, and release Mr. Cosby without probation. He 
would no longer be on probation and the requested judicial relief would have affected his 
rights. Therefore, Mr. Cosby's appeal is not moot and this Court should consider his issue 
on its merits. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED MR. COSBY'S 
CHANGED LIFE CIRCUMSTANCES AS MITIGATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN SENTENCING HIM 
The trial court should have considered Mr. Cosby's love for his son and his desire 
to be a part of his upbringing as a mitigating circumstance when sentencing him. Mr. 
Cosby argued in his Appellant's Brief that even though a district court is accorded "wide 
latitude in sentencing," a judge's sentencing discretion is not unlimited, State v. Bluff, 
2002 UT 66, U 66, 52 P.3d 1210; State v. Carson, 597 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1979). A 
sentencing court may abuse its discretion if (1) the court's actions were "inherently 
2 
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unfair," State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah 1997) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), (2) the court imposed a "clearly excessive sentence," id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted), or (3) the court failed to consider "all the legally relevant factors," id, 
and "give adequate weight to . . . mitigating circumstances." State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, 
f 15, 40 P.3d 626 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The State has responded that Mr. Cosby's reliance on Helms, 2002 UT 12, <fl 15, as 
authority for the proposition that the trial court should consider mitigating circumstances 
in sentencing is misplaced because that case involved "whether the trial court had abused 
its discretion by failing to consider all of the factors set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 
76-3-401 (West 2009) for the imposition of consecutive sentences." Appellee's Br. 13 
n.3. But the Utah Supreme Court's directive that Mr. Cosby's Appellant's Brief quotes 
from that case—that a trial court must give "adequate weight to . . . mitigating 
circumstances"—applies even in cases where the "mitigating circumstances" to be 
applied are not enumerated in section 76-3-401. Indeed, the directive for sentencing 
courts to consider mitigating circumstances appears in cases that do not involve a 
concurrent/consecutive decision at all. See, e.g., State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, f^lj 57-61, 
191 P.3d 17 (stating, in response to a defendant's argument that she should have been 
sentenced to probation instead of prison, "[although courts must consider all legally 
relevant factors in making a sentencing decision, not all aggravating and mitigating 
factors are equally important"); State v. Erskine, 2011 UT App 20, fflf 2-3, 246 P.3d 1218 
(per curiam) (same). Thus, even if mitigating factors are not statutorily enumerated, 
sentencing courts must still consider them in their sentencing decision. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Cosby urges on appeal that the sentencing court did not adequately consider 
the mitigating circumstance of his new fatherhood. While, as the State notes and as Mr. 
Cosby conceded in his Appellant's Brief, it was his desire to see his son that caused him 
to violate the protective orders at issue in this case, see Appellee's Br. 12; Appellant's Br. 
9, Mr. Cosby now recognizes that violating a court's protective orders is not the proper 
way to visit his son and may jeopardize his ability to have a relationship with his son at 
all. And even Stacey Buchanan, Mr. Cosby's son's mother who was protected by the 
court order Mr. Cosby violated, agrees that it is in all interested parties' best interest that 
Mr. Cosby spend time with his son. See Record for Case No. 101905723 at 47:8 ("He 
takes care of his son very well."). For this reason, Mr. Cosby believes that the district 
court did not adequately weigh his mitigating evidence and that the sentence of both jail 
time and thirty-six months of zero-tolerance probation was excessive and inherently 
unfair. Mr. Cosby urges that this Court reverse his sentence and remand for resentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
Because this appeal is not moot, this Court should consider Mr. Cosby's issue on 
its merits. Based on the arguments made above and in Mr. Cosby's Appellant's Brief, Mr. 
Cosby respectfully asks this Court to reverse and remand for resentencing because he 
believes that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to give adequate weight to a 
mitigating factor at sentencing, denying his request to be placed on probation, and 
sentencing him instead additionally to jail. Upon reversal, now that he has served the jail 
portion of his sentence, he would respectfully request credit for time served without the 
added imposition of zero-tolerance probation. 
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SUBMITTED this Okday of July, 2011. 
^ ^ f e W ^ 
E. RICH HAWKES 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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I, E. RICH HAWKES, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered the 
original and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 
5th Floor, P.O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the 
Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, 
P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this^falay of July, 2011. 
^brfe?W^ 
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